The area of belief revision studies how a rational agent may incorporate new information about a domain into its belief corpus. An agent is characterized by a belief state K, and receives a new item of information α which is to be included among its set of beliefs. Revision then is a function from a belief state and a formula to a new belief state. We propose here a more general framework for belief revision, in which revision is a function from a belief state and a finite set of formulas to a new belief state. In particular, we distinguish revision by the set {α, β} from the set {α ∧ β}. This seemingly innocuous change has significant ramifications with respect to iterated belief revision. A problem in approaches to iterated belief revision is that, after first revising by a formula and then by a formula that is inconsistent with the first formula, all information in the original formula is lost. This problem is avoided here in that, in revising by a set of formulas S, the resulting belief state contains not just the information that members of S are believed to be true, but also the counterfactual supposition that if some members of S were later believed to be false, then the remaining members would nonetheless still be believed to be true. Thus if some members of S were in fact later believed to be false, then the other elements of S would still be believed to be true. Hence, we provide a more nuanced approach to belief revision. The general approach, which we call parallel belief revision, is independent of extant approaches to iterated revision. We present first a basic approach to parallel belief revision. Following this we combine the basic approach with an approach due to Jin and Thielscher for iterated revision. Postulates and semantic conditions characterizing these approaches are given, and representation results provided. We conclude with a discussion of the possible ramifications of this approach in belief revision in general.
Introduction
An agent situated in a sufficiently complex domain will have only incomplete and possibly inaccurate information about that domain. Consequently, such an agent would be expected to receive new information about the domain which it would incorporate into its belief corpus. Since new information may conflict with the agent's accepted beliefs, the agent may also have to discard some of its beliefs before the new information can be consistently incorporated. Belief revision is the area of knowledge representation that addresses how an agent may incorporate new information about a domain into its belief corpus. It is generally accepted that there is no single best revision operator, and different agents may have different revision functions. However, revision functions are not arbitrary, but may be considered as being guided or characterised by various rationality criteria, expressed formally as a set of postulates. The original and best-known set of postulates is called the AGM postulates [ Alchourrón et al., 1985; Gärdenfors, 1988 ] named after the developers of this framework. As well, several formal constructions of revision functions have been proposed based, for example, on an ordering on sentences of the language or on an ordering on possible states of the world. Ideally, a set of postulates is linked with a formal construction by a representation result, showing that a revision function that satisfies a postulate set can be represented by the formal construction, and vice versa.
The foundations of AGM revision are well studied and well understood. 1 Subsequently, there has been a great deal of attention paid to iterated belief revision, which addresses logical relations among a sequence of revisions involving possibly-conflicting observations. While there has been much progress in the area of iterated belief revision, virtually all such work suffers from the following problem: if one revises by a formula and then by a formula that is inconsistent with this formula, then the agent's beliefs are exactly the same as if only the second revision had taken place.
For example, consider the situation where there was a party, but where you have no knowledge about whether Alice (a) or Bob (b) were there. You are subsequently informed by a reliable source that both Alice and Bob went to the party. This would correspond to a revision by a ∧ b, and your resulting belief state would be one in which you believe a ∧ b to be true. You later learn that Alice in fact did not go to the party. Not only do you now accept ¬a, but in all major approaches to iterated belief revision, including [ Darwiche and Pearl, 1997; Boutilier, 1993; Nayak et al., 2003; Jin and Thielscher, 2007 ] , you no longer accept b either. While there may indeed be cases where it's reasonable to no longer believe Bob was at the party (for example perhaps Bob is Alice's spouse), this certainly shouldn't be a required outcome.
This example can be exaggerated to emphasise the point: Consider where an agent initially has no contingent beliefs, and so its beliefs are characterised by the set of tautologies. Next, a substantial body of knowledge, given by the conjunction p 1 ∧ . . . ∧ p 10 12 , is loaded into the agent's knowledge base. If we subsequently revise by, say, the negation of p 1 , then all other knowledge is lost. That is, if the agent's original (tautological) beliefs were given by K and * is the revision function, we would obtain:
(K * (p 1 ∧ . . . ∧ p 10 12 )) * ¬p 1 ≡ K * ¬p 1 .
Thus all other information is lost, except for the newly-negated item. Again, this is clearly too strong a condition to impose on every revision function in all circumstances.
We suggest that this problem is appropriately addressed not by modifying the foundations of belief revision, but rather by providing a more nuanced or expressive approach to revision. Specifically, we propose that the second argument of a revision function be generalised to be a set of formulas. This then distinguishes revision by a set of formulas from revision by the conjunction of that set of formulas. Consider again our Alice/Bob example, where again at the outset you have no beliefs about whether either of them attended a party or not, but you are subsequently informed that they both went to the party. Consequently, if you were now asked "Do you believe that Alice went to the party?", clearly you would answer in the affirmative. Assume further that you have no reason to believe that Alice and Bob know each other well, nor have been in contact; i.e. each individual's attendance is independent of the other's. If you were asked "If it were in fact the case that Alice did not go, would you still believe that Bob went?", then again you would answer in the affirmative. However, it can be noted that this last question is a counterfactual query, in that as far as you know the antecedent is false. We are not going to be concerned with counterfactuals per se in this paper; however, this does have implications for further revisions: If you were subsequently informed that in fact Alice did not go, then you should in turn continue to believe that Bob went. If, on the other hand, you had some reason to believe that Alice and Bob's attendance were linked -for example that they're a couple -then this would no longer apply.
The key point here is that we are treating the propositions A and B as separate items of information. Our central thesis is that revision by a conjunction and revision by the set of conjuncts should be treated differently. If a formula is taken as representing some item of information, then informally a conjunction represents a single item of information, while the corresponding set of conjuncts represents a collection of items of information. To be sure, the conjunction α ∧ β and the set {α, β} have the same logical content, in that they entail exactly the same formulas. Hence an agent's contingent beliefs should be the same regardless of whether a revision is by a conjunction or a corresponding set of formulas. However, as argued above, in revising by a set {α, β} the agent's resulting belief state should be such that, if there is no known connection between α and β, then if β were subsequently learned to be false, then α should still be believed to be true.
To this end, we develop an account of belief revision that we call parallel belief revision in which the second argument to a revision function is a finite set of formulas. Thus, if the agent's belief state is given by K 2 and * is a revision function, then we distinguish K * {α ∧ β} from K * {α, β}. In the former, revision is by a single formula that happens to be expressed as a conjunction. If a subsequent revision contradicts this formula, then this formula is simply no longer believed. On the other hand, if the agent views α and β as independent, then it makes sense that α is believed in K * {α, β} * {¬β}, since if one element of the input set is contradicted, this need not affect belief in other element. Essentially, for a revision K * {α, β}, the agent comes to believe not only that α and β are contingently true, but also counterfactual assertions such as if β were false then α would (where "reasonable") still be believed to be true. In terminology introduced in the next section, the agent's belief state or epistemic state is modified so that such counterfactuals are implicitly believed. Hence, continuing the above example, if the agent were told that in fact β were false then it would (again with a caveat, "where reasonable") continue to believe that α was true. That is, all other things being equal, we would have that α is believed in K * {α, β} * {¬β}.
In this paper, we develop approaches to parallel belief revision and show how the aforementioned problems are resolved. Notably, in our approach we obtain that under reasonable assumptions (for example, that α and β are not logically equivalent) that α is believed in K * {α, β} * {¬β}. As well, it proves to be the case that parallel belief revision is independent of other accounts of iterated belief revision, in that it can be combined with extant approaches to belief revision. This then supports the assertion that our approach provides a more fine-grained account of revision, rather than providing an alternative to existing accounts. Consequently, we first describe the most basic approach to parallel revision, and then show how this approach can be combined with the approach to iterated revision of Jin and Thielscher [ 2007 ] .
The next section reviews the area of belief revision and further motivates our approach. Following this, we give an account of the most basic approach to parallel revision. We then combine this approach with that of Jin and Thielscher [ 2007 ] . In each case, postulates characterizing the revision function are given, a semantic account is provided, and a representation result is provided linking the postulates and semantic construction. We conclude with a discussion of wider implications of the approach to belief revision as a whole, and iterated revision in particular. Proofs of all formal results are given in an appendix. An earlier version of this paper appeared in [ Delgrande and Jin, 2008 ] .
Background

Formal Preliminaries
We assume a propositional language L generated from a finite set P of atomic propositions. The language is that of classical propositional logic, and with the classical consequence relation . Formulas are denoted by lower-case Greek letters α, β, . . . , while sets of formulas are denoted by upper case Roman letters, A, B, S, . . . . The symbol stands for some arbitrary tautology and ⊥ stands for ¬ . Cn(A) is the set of logical consequences of A, that is Cn(A) = {α ∈ L | A α}. For a (finite) set of formulas S, ∧S is the conjunction of members of S, ∨S is the corresponding disjunction, and S = {¬α | α ∈ S}. Given two sets of formulas A and B, A + B denotes the expansion of A by B, that is A + B = Cn(A ∪ B). Expansion of a set A by a formula β is defined analogously. Two sentences α and β are logically equivalent, written α ≡ β, iff α β and β α. This extends to sets of sentences by: S 1 ≡ S 2 iff S 1 α for every α ∈ S 2 and S 2 β for every β ∈ S 1 . Thus in particular for any finite set of formulas S, we have S ≡ ∧S.
A propositional interpretation (also referred to as a possible world) is a mapping from P to {true, false}. The set of all interpretations is denoted by Θ P . A model of a sentence α is an interpretation w that makes α true according to the usual definition of truth, and is denoted by w |= α. For W ⊆ Θ P , we also write W |= α if w |= α for every w ∈ W. For a set of sentences A, Mod (A) is the set of all models of A. For simplicity, Mod ({α}) is also written as Mod (α). Conversely, given a set of possible worlds W ⊆ Θ P , we denote by T (W) the set of sentences which are true in all elements of W, that is T (W) = {α ∈ L | w |= α for all w ∈ W}.
A total preorder is a reflexive, transitive binary relation, such that either w 1 w 2 or w 2 w 1 for every w 1 , w 2 . The strict part of is denoted by ≺, that is, w 1 w 2 and w 2 w 1 . We use w 1 = w 2 to abbreviate w 1 w 2 and w 2 w 1 . 3 Given a set S and total preorder defined on members of S, we denote by min(S, ) the set of minimal elements of S in .
Belief Revision
In the original AGM theory, beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief set, that is, a set of formulas K such that K = Cn(K). Belief revision is modeled as a function from a belief set K and a formula α to a belief set K such that α is believed in K , i.e. α ∈ K . Since α may be inconsistent with K, and since it is desirable to maintain consistency if at all possible (i.e. if not ¬α), then some formulas may need to dropped from K before α can be consistently added. The AGM approach also addressed two other operators. The expansion of a belief set K by a formula α has already been defined in the previous subsection. In contrast to revision and expansion, where an agent gains information, in belief contraction the reasoner loses information. The contraction of a belief set K by a formula α, denoted K−α, is a belief set where K−α ⊆ K and α ∈ K−α. So in a contraction by α, the agent loses its belief in α while not necessarily believing ¬α. Since our focus in this paper is on revision, we do not consider contraction further, except briefly in Section 2.4, where we review set-based approaches to contraction that have been proposed in the literature.
An important assumption concerning belief revision is that it takes place in an inertial (or static) world, so that the input is with respect to the same, static world. However, various researchers have argued that, in order to address iterated belief revision, it is more appropriate to consider belief states (also called epistemic states) as objects of revision. A belief state K effectively encodes information regarding how the revision function itself changes under a revision. 4 The belief set corresponding to belief state K is denoted Bel (K). Formally, a revision operator * maps a belief state K and formula α to a revised belief state K * α. Then, in the spirit of [ Darwiche and Pearl, 1997 ] , the AGM postulates for revision can be reformulated as follows:
Thus, the result of revising K by α yields an epistemic state in which α is believed in the corresponding belief set ((K * 1), (K * 2)); whenever the result is consistent, the revised belief set consists of the expansion of Bel (K) by α ((K * 3), (K * 4)); the only time that Bel (K) is inconsistent is when α is inconsistent ((K * 5)); and revision is independent of the syntactic form of the formula for revision ((K * 6)). The first six postulates are referred to as the basic revision postulates. The last two postulates are called the supplementary postulates, and deal with the relation between revising by a conjunction and expansion: whenever consistent, revision by a conjunction corresponds to revision by one conjunct and expansion by the other. Motivation for these postulates can be found in [ Gärdenfors, 1988; Peppas, 2008 ] . The intent of these postulates is that they should hold for any rational belief revision function. We will call a revision operator an AGM revision operator if it satisfies the reformulated AGM postulates. Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 1991 ] have shown that a necessary and sufficient condition for constructing an AGM revision operator is that any belief state K can induce, as its preferential information, a total preorder on the set of possible worlds.
Definition 1 A faithful assignment is a function that maps each belief state K to a total preorder K on Θ P such that for any w 1 , w 2 ∈ Θ P :
The resulting total preorder is referred to as the faithful ranking corresponding to, or induced by K. Intuitively, w 1 K w 2 if w 1 is at least as plausible as w 2 , according to the agent. As enforced by the first condition in Definition 1, an agent's beliefs are characterised by the least worlds in the ordering. Katsuno and Mendelzon then provide the following representation result, where T (W ) is the set of formulas of classical logic true in W :
Theorem 1 ( [ Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991 ] ) A revision operator * satisfies postulates (K * 1)-(K * 8) iff there exists a faithful assignment that maps each belief set K to a total preorder K such that
Thus for a belief state K, the agent's beliefs following revision by a formula α are characterised by those possible worlds of φ that are most plausible according to the agent. A ranking function K corresponding to belief state K can also be understood as specifying the (counterfactual) information of what the agent would believe after coming to believe some formula φ.
Iterated Belief Revision
The AGM postulates do not address properties of iterated belief revision. This can be seen by observing that, while Theorem 1 specifies what the agent's beliefs will be following a revision by formula φ, it has nothing to say about what the new ranking function K * φ should look like. As noted by [ Nayak et al., 2003 ] , the only interesting result that follows from the AGM approach concerning iterated belief revision is the following:
This has led to the development of extensions of the AGM approach to address iterated revision; the best-known approach is that of Darwiche and Pearl [ 1997 ] (DP). They propose the following postulates, adapted according to our notation:
(C1) states that if an agent revises by a formula and then by a logically stronger formula then, with respect to its belief set, this is no different than simply revising by the stronger formula. The other postulates may be given similar informal readings. As with the AGM postulates, the intent is that these postulates should hold for any rational belief revision function. Darwiche and Pearl show that an AGM revision operator satisfies Postulates (C1)-(C4) iff the way it revises faithful rankings satisfies the (respective) conditions:
These conditions are natural and appealing; moreover they appear to be intuitively very reasonable: When K is revised by α, Conditions (CR1) and (CR2) require that the relative ranking of any two α-worlds (resp. ¬α-worlds) do not change. Conditions (CR3) and (CR4) require that if an α-world w 1 is (strictly) more plausible than a ¬α-world w 2 , then following revision by α, w 1 continues to be (strictly) more plausible than w 2 . The DP postulates have been criticised in two respects. On one hand, it has been suggested that they are too permissive, in that they support revision operators which allow arbitrary dependencies among the items of information which an agent acquires along the way. Consequently, Jin and Thielscher [ 2007 ] have proposed the so-called postulate of independence:
Thus, if a revision of K by β does not rule out α, then if K is first revised by α and then by β, α is believed in the resulting belief set. Postulate (Ind) strengthens both (C3) and (C4). Thus, the suggested set of postulates according to Jin and Thielscher [ 2007 ] consists of (C1), (C2), and (Ind). They also give a necessary and sufficient condition for an AGM revision operator to satisfy (Ind):
(IndR) If w 1 |= α and w 2 |= ¬α, then
This condition is also natural: if α is true at w 1 and false at w 2 , and if w 1 and w 2 are equally plausible, then after revising by α, w 1 is strictly more plausible than w 2 . If w 1 ≺ K w 2 then we simply have (CR3). On the other hand, it can be argued that the DP postulates are too strong. In particular, Postulate (C2) has been noted by many researchers as producing the undesirable result described in Section 1 [ Lehmann, 1995b; Konieczny and Pino Pérez, 2000; Delgrande and Schaub, 2003 ] . As a further example, consider a scenario proposed by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [ 2000 ] :
Example 1 Suppose an electric circuit contains an adder and a multiplier. The atomic propositions a and m denote respectively that the adder and the multiplier are working. Initially we have no information about this circuit; and we then learn that the adder and the multiplier are working (α = a ∧ m). Thereafter, someone tells us that the adder is actually not working (β = ¬a).
As argued in [ Konieczny and Pino Pérez, 2000 ] , there is no reason to "forget" that the multiplier is working; however by (C2) we must have (K * α) * β = K * β, since β ¬α. Hence, in this case (C2) appears to be too strong.
Intuitively, such examples are compelling. However, the case against (C2) isn't clear cut. First, it can be observed that many researchers (e.g., [ Lehmann, 1995b; Konieczny and Pino Pérez, 2000 ] ), who are against (C2) are nonetheless quite happy with Postulate (C1). However, the semantic characterization of Postulate (C2) (viz. (CR2)) seems as reasonable as that of (C1) (viz. (CR1)): If being informed about α does not change the relative plausibility of α-worlds, why should the relative ordering of ¬α-worlds be changed? This idea is also articulated in [ Spohn, 1988 ] , which argues that in a belief change involving α, the relative ordering between α-worlds remains unchanged, as it does between ¬α-worlds.
As an informal defense of (C2), it can be observed that in Example 1 it is implicitly assumed that a and m are separate items of information. However, in the AGM approach, a simultaneous revision by a and m can only be represented by a conjunction, viz. K * (a ∧ b). What makes Example 1 credible is the fact that there is no apparent relation between being informed of the adder working and, at the same time, of the multiplier working. Hence learning ¬a would seem to not influence belief in m. However, the example can be elaborated upon so that this isn't necessarily the case. Consider for example where we are told by someone that both the adder and multiplier are working, and then determine ourselves that the adder is not working. One might argue plausibly that the original source was suspect, and so it makes sense to give up in toto all information provided by that source. Thus plausibly in this case one might want to not believe that m was true. 6 This discussion shows that a revision of a belief state K by formulas α and β can be interpreted in at least two different ways. In the first interpretation, the agent has been informed that α and β are true; to revise simultaneously by α and β, the best that can be done is to revise by their conjunction. In the second interpretation, the agent has been informed of an item of information, and this item of information has been expressed as a conjunction. Under the first interpretation, α and β are regarded as separate items of information; under this interpretation it is reasonable that (C2) not necessarily hold. Under the second interpretation, α and β are seen as components of an item of information; here it seems reasonable that (C2) does hold. Clearly, extant accounts of iterated belief revision are not sufficiently expressive to deal with both situations. Thus, Example 1 doesn't provide a counterexample to (C2), so much as it highlights the limitations of the expressibility of revision functions. What this suggests then is that AGM revision should be generalised so that both above-mentioned situations can be handled.
Conjunctions of Formulas vs. Sets of Formulas
The preceding discussion suggests that K * (α ∧ β) should be treated differently from K * {α, β}. The former case represents the situation in the AGM framework in which revision is by a formula, here comprised of two conjuncts. In the latter case, revision is by a set of formulas. An immediate effect of this distinction is that revision now becomes a function whose second argument is a set of formulas, rather than a single formula. Hence the above distinction is appropriately expressed as K * {α ∧ β} vs. K * {α, β}.
This distinction between a set of formulas and their conjunction has been noted and explored elsewhere and under different guises. Perhaps the most direct recognition of this distinction is in [ Konieczny et al., 2005 ] . There the comma that appears in an expression of a set of objects is referred to as "the forgotten connective". Their interests however concern reasoning under inconsistency, where one can plausibly make the argument that there are cases where a distinction between {a ∧ b ∧ ¬b} and {a, b, ¬b} is of value.
As well, the distinction between a set of formulas and their conjunction has cropped up in nonmonotonic reasoning, specifically with respect to nonmonotonic inference relations, conditional logics, and related systems (see [ Kraus et al., 1990; Lamarre, 1991; Boutilier, 1994a ] for monotonic systems of defaults, and [ Pearl, 1990; Boutilier, 1994b; Benferhat et al., 1992; Lehmann and Magidor, 1992 ] for nonmonotonic approaches). In these systems, a default "if α then normally β" can be written α ⇒ β in a conditional logic or α | ∼β in a nonmonotonic inference relation. There is a difficulty with such approaches, in that for defaults α ⇒ β 1 and α ⇒ β 2 if α is known to be contingently true while β 1 is false, one would still want to conclude β 2 by default. Similarly, if α is known to be contingently true, where |= α ⊃ γ and γ ⇒ β is a default, one would want to conclude β by default in general. However these results are difficult to obtain. These issues have been addressed in several ways, but solutions in general have relied on how a default is represented. In [ Geffner and Pearl, 1992 ] , possible worlds are ranked according to the defaults that they violate. In the approach of [ Goldszmidt et al., 1990 ] , maximum entropy is used to essentially assert that things are as normal as possible. The lexicographic closure of a set of defaults [ Lehmann, 1995a; Benferhat et al., 1993 ] formalises the idea that in applying defaults, one prefers to violate a smaller number of defaults to violating a larger number. All these approaches are syntax dependent, in that they depend on how a set of defaults is represented. In particular, one may obtain different answers for the set of defaults {α ⇒ β 1 , α ⇒ β 2 } as opposed to {α ⇒ (β 1 ∧ β 2 )}: if β 1 is false, then in the former case one may still conclude β 2 whereas in the latter case the default as a whole is inapplicable. So, roughly, the intuition underlying the lexicographic closure is that as many defaults are applied as consistently possible, and the results of this notion of maximum applicability will vary depending on how the defaults are expressed. The focus in the approach presented here is somewhat different: one revises by a set of formulas S, and this set is accepted. (In particular, if S is inconsistent then the agent falls into an inconsistent belief state.) If the agent subsequently learns that some elements of S are in fact false then, where consistent, the remaining elements of S are still believed to be true. So for two sets of formuals S and S where S ≡ S , the agent's beliefs will be the same in K * S and K * S , but may differ in subsequent revisions.
With respect to belief change, a belief base [ Hansson, 1999 ] is a set of formulas representing an agent's beliefs. Since a belief base is in general not deductively closed, it may be seen as having more structure than the corresponding belief set. Hence belief change with respect to a belief base may have differing results, depending on how the agent's beliefs are expressed. For example, [ Meyer, 2001 ] considers a scenario in which the agent's beliefs are represented by an infobase consisting of a finite sequence of formulas. Each formula in the infobase is assumed to be an explicit piece of information, obtained independently from the other formulas. For contraction, an ordering is specified over interpretations depending on the number of formulas in the infobase that they satisfy. Hence if two formulas in an infobase were replaced by their conjunction, one would expect quite different results. Somewhat similar intuitions are employed for disjunctive maxiadjustment [ Benferhat et al., 2004 ] ; see also [ Williams, 1994 ] . An ordered knowledge base is employed toward conflict resolution, for application to tasks such as belief change and information integration. An ordered knowledge base places a ranking on formulas, which can be seen as a compact representation of an ordinal conditional function [ Spohn, 1988 ] . Interpretations are ranked by the highest formula that they falsify (and given rank 0 if all formulas are satisfied). The disjunctive maxi-adjustment is shown to satisfy a lexicographic strategy, which is to say, essentially a maximal set of formulas for a given rank is selected. Since one is working at the level of formulas, again results depend on how the formulas are represented.
The preceding approaches to belief change consider a knowledge base as being comprised of a set of (possibly ranked) formulas. There has also been work in which the input for belief change is a set of formulas, rather than a single formula. [ Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994 ] surveys multiple contraction; in particular they propose package contraction, which is concerned with removing a set of formulas from a belief set. In the AGM approach, a contraction K − α yields a belief set K that is a subset of K in which α is not believed (except in the case where α is a tautology). The standard construction for contraction is phrased in terms of remainder sets, or maximal subsets of K that fail to imply α. In a package contraction such as K − {α, β}, the resulting belief set is one in which neither α nor β is believed. The notion of remainder set extends naturally in this case to maximal subsets of K that fail to imply either α or β. It can be noted that the package contraction K −{α, β} is distinct from contraction K −(α∧β) or K −(α∨β). In the former case, it is possible that α ∈ K − (α ∧ β) although this is not allowed in the corresponding package contraction. For the latter case, it is possible that α ∨ β ∈ K − {α, β}, although clearly α ∨ β ∈ K − (α ∨ β).
[ Fuhrmann and Hansson, 1994 ] also give a set of postulates for package contraction analogous to the set of basic postulates for AGM contraction, and they prove a representation result linking these postulates to the semantic construction.
The multiple contraction in [ Zhang et al., 1997 ] also studies how to contract a belief set so that it is consistent with a set of formulas. In this work, the authors propose supplementary postulates for multiple contraction and provide a representation result; they also consider the case where the set for contraction may be infinite. In other work, [ Fermé et al., 2003 ] examines a construction for multiple contraction in a (non-deductively-closed) belief base, while [ Falappa et al., 2002 ] addresses revision of an arbitrary set of formulas by a set of explanations, with application to argumentation systems. Last, [ Delgrande and Wassermann, 2010 ] consider package contraction where the underlying logic is that governing Horn clauses. Here package contraction is of greater importance than in the case of classical logic, since in classical logic one has the option of contracting by several formulas via contracting their disjunction. However, the disjunction of Horn clauses in general is not Horn, and so one requires package contraction to concurrently remove several formulas.
It can be noted that while these approaches to set-based contraction have a syntactic resemblance to the approach developed here, the emphasis is quite different. In a package or multiple contraction K − S, the resulting belief set in general is different from a contraction made up of some Boolean combination of members of S. On the other hand, none of these approaches address iterated operations. In contrast, in our approach it will be seen that the belief set resulting from K ⊗ S and from K ⊗ {∧S} will be the same. However the faithful rankings resulting from K ⊗ S and K ⊗ {∧S} will in general be quite different, and this will have significant ramifications for iterated revision.
There has also been work in revision by sets of formulas, in particular the set revision of [ Zhang and Foo, 2001 ] and multiple revision of [ Peppas, 2004 ] . There are two main differences between these approaches and our's. First, our focus is on iterated revision and, in particular, constraints that need to be imposed on an agent's underlying epistemic state in order to effect plausible revisions. Second, [ Zhang and Foo, 2001 ] and [ Peppas, 2004 ] primarily study infinite sets. In our approach, the focus is on the distinction between revising by a finite set of formulas and a corresponding conjunction of those formulas. Therefore, while set revision or multiple revision might be useful for investigating infinite non-monotonic reasoning, arguably our approach is more suitable for modelling the evolution of an agent's belief state where, at least in a practical setting, an agent will not receive an infinite set as input. Finally, [ Nayak, 1994 ] anticipates some of the properties of parallel revision, in an approach where both the belief state and input are represented by epistemic entrenchment relations.
3 Parallel Revision
Intuitions
We have argued that K * {α∧β} should be treated differently from K * {α, β}. Hence the epistemic state resulting from K * {α ∧ β} will in general be different from that resulting from K * {α, β}. However, the logical content of {α ∧ β} and {α, β} is the same, and so one might reasonably expect that the agent's beliefs following revision by either of these sets would be the same. Thus one might reasonably expect that Bel(K * {α, β}) = Bel(K * {α ∧ β}).
On the right hand side of the equality we revise by a single item of information, α ∧ β. If β is later shown to be false, then so too is α ∧ β, and it is reasonable that all original information (including α) may be lost. Hence, possibly α ∈ Bel(K * {α ∧ β} * {¬β}). This argument doesn't apply to Bel(K * {α, β}), where we revise by a set consisting of two items of information. Thus if we later revise by ¬β, then one would expect that α ∈ Bel(K * {α, β} * {¬β}) where "reasonable". 7 Semantically, this has the following ramifications. An agent's belief state (at least as far as revision is concerned) is modelled by a faithful ranking on possible worlds. In the faithful ranking that results from the revision K * {α, β}, we have that the least α ∧ β worlds are ranked lower than the least ¬(α ∧ β) worlds in K * {α,β} . (This is a trivial consequence of the fact that the least α ∧ β worlds are minimal in K * {α,β} ). The key intuition in parallel revision is that these considerations extend to subsets of the set of formulas for revision. Hence, in revising by {α, β}, α and β are accepted as being true. However, implicit in the revision is the (counterfactual) notion that if β were found to not be true then α would still be held to be true. Semantically, this means that, among the ¬β worlds, the least α worlds are ranked below the least ¬α worlds. This then would have the effect that if β were later determined to be false, thus necessitating a revision by ¬β, then α would still be believed to be true. These considerations extend straightforwardly to arbitrary (but finite) sets of formulas. Thus, for a set of formulas S, after the revision K * S all elements of S will be believed. Implicit in the resulting ranking function is the counterfactual notion that if the members of some subset of S, say S , were found to be false, then S \ S would still be believed to be true. This then has the effect that in K * S * S , members of S \ S will continue to be believed.
Another way of thinking of the underlying procedure is that in a revision K * S, subsets of S implicitly define a context that provides additional structure in the resulting ranking function. That is, in K * S, the minimal S worlds are ranked below all ¬(∧S) worlds. For S ⊂ S, in the "context" of S the same considerations apply. Thus, in the restriction of the ranking function to S worlds, the minimal S \ S worlds are ranked below all ¬(∧(S \ S )) worlds.
Essentially then, for a revision K * S, changes to the underlying ranking on worlds will depend not just on the set S, but also on subsets of S. The intuition is that, in revising by S, all elements of S are believed; if some members of S are subsequently disbelieved then, insofar as possible, the remaining members of S are still believed. In the next subsection we formalise this intuition. The approach is independent of previous approaches to iterated revision, in that it can be combined with an existing approach to iterated revision to yield a "parallel" hybrid of that approach. Consequently, in the following section we combine the basic approach with that of [ Jin and Thielscher, 2007 ] to yield what we suggest is the appropriate general model for iterated belief revision.
The Basic Approach
This section describes the basic approach to parallel revision, in which new information for revision is represented by a finite set of formulas. The intuition is that each formula of the set represents an undecomposable (with regards to revision) piece of information. To distinguish this from standard belief revision, we denote a parallel revision operator by ⊗. Formally, ⊗ maps a belief state K and finite set of formulas S to a revised belief state K ⊗ S. We assume henceforth that the second argument to ⊗ is a finite, nonempty 8 set of formulas.
To begin, we adapt the AGM postulates for revision by a set of formulas. The following are analogous to postulates given in [ Peppas, 2004 ] , adapted for belief states.
With a slight abuse of terminology, we will also refer to revision operators that satisfy the above postulates as AGM revision operators.
It has been shown in [ Peppas, 2004 ] that the representation theorem of [ Grove, 1988 ] can be generalised to revision by a set of formulas. Given that we deal with a finite language, the systems of spheres of Grove's construction are interdefinable with faithful rankings, and so the representation theorem of [ Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991 ] can also be generalised:
A revision operator ⊗ satisfies (K ⊗ 1) -(K ⊗ 8) iff there exists a faithful ranking K for an arbitrary belief state K, such that for any set of sentences S:
For the basic approach to parallel revision, we give two postulates and semantic conditions that characterise the approach.
The following postulates characterise the basic approach to parallel revision.
information. Second, it eases the technical development. Last, while revision by ∅ could be equated most naturally with revision by { }, the resulting revision K * { } isn't entirely trivial, since in the case that Bel(K) is inconsistent (K*5) stipulates that the revision by the empty set is sufficient to extract an agent from the inconsistent belief state.
(P ⊗ ) is a postulate of success preservation. It asserts that for a revision of K by S, a subset S 1 ⊂ S is preserved in revising by the negations of members of S \ S 1 whenever it is consistent to do so. This reflects the intuition that, in revising by S and after which some members of S are subsequently disbelieved, then insofar as possible the remaining members of S are still believed. (S ⊗ ) expresses the fact that for set S and subset S 1 ⊂ S, revising by S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) yields the same beliefs as first revising by S and then by S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ). Thus it expresses a condition of conservativism with respect to iterated belief.
These postulates can be combined as follows:
Thus revising by a set S and then the negations of some members of S yields the same belief set as revising by the negations of these members in S together with the remaining members of S. We obtain the following result:
Then ⊗ satisfies (PP ⊗ ) if and only if it satisfies (P ⊗ ) and (S ⊗ ).
In order to justify the postulates (P ⊗ ) and (S ⊗ ), we turn next to the corresponding conditions on faithful orderings. From a semantic point of view, consider the following condition on a faithful ranking K⊗S defined in terms of a faithful ranking K .
Unsurprisingly, these conditions can also be combined into the single condition:
Thus, informally, for S 1 ⊂ S, the minimum S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) worlds in a faithful ranking are just the minimum (S \ S 1 ) worlds following revision by S. This in turn means that following revision by S, S 1 will be true at the least (S \ S 1 ) worlds, as desired.
Proposition 2 Suppose K is a faithful ranking. Then K satisfies (PP ⊗ R) if and only if it satisfies (P ⊗ R) and (S ⊗ R).
For illustration, consider the following examples:
Example 2 Let P = {a, b}, and let the agent's faithful ranking be given as follows:
Thus Bel (K) = Cn(a ∧ ¬b). There are three possible faithful rankings resulting from K ⊗ {a, b} = K :
This example is very simple. In fact it can be observed in the example that, since the possible worlds correspond to subsets of {a, b}, the possible outcomes are independent of the initial belief state K. The next example is a little more complicated.
Example 3 Let P = {a, b, c}, and let the agent's faithful ranking be given as follows:
For K ⊗ {a, b} = K , three possible faithful rankings are as follows:
Thus Bel (K) = Cn(a ∧ ¬b) and Bel (K ) = Cn(a ∧ b ∧ c). Two properties can be observed for each of the example rankings for K . First, for any S 1 ⊆ S = {a, b}, the minimum S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) worlds are the same in K and K . Thus the minimum {a, b} worlds in each case is given by {abc}, and the minimum {a, ¬b} worlds is given by {abc, abc}. Second, for any S 2 ⊂ S 1 ⊆ S = {a, b}, the minimum S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) worlds are ranked strictly lower than the minimum S 2 ∪ (S \ S 2 ) worlds. Hence, the minimum {a, b} worlds are ranked strictly lower than the minimum {a, ¬b} and {¬a, b} worlds, and these latter sets are strictly lower than the minimum {¬a, ¬b} worlds. Otherwise, for the three rankings given in the example, the first is not particularly special one way or another. The second, in a sense, is the most compact possible ranking, in that worlds are positioned as low in the ranking as possible. The third ranking has the property that for S 2 ⊂ S 1 ⊆ S, every S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) world is ranked below every S 2 ∪ (S \ S 2 ) world. This last example can be seen as extending the approach of [ Nayak et al., 2003 ] or [ Jin and Thielscher, 2007 ] to apply to subsets of a set for revision; we develop this latter point in Section 4 with regards to [ Jin and Thielscher, 2007 ] .
The next result expresses basic properties of faithful rankings that satisfy (P ⊗ R) and (S ⊗ R).
Proposition 3 Let K be a belief state and let K be the faithful ranking induced by K. Let ⊗ revise faithful rankings corresponding to an AGM revision operator, and let K⊗S be a faithful ranking satisfying (P ⊗ R) and (S ⊗ R).
2. Let S 2 ⊂ S 1 ⊂ S and S 2 S 1 .
If w 1 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ) and w 2 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 2 ), K⊗S ) then w 1 ≺ K⊗S w 2 .
The first part expresses the fundamental intuition underlying the approach: after revising by a set of formulas S, in the resulting faithful ordering restricted to (S \ S 1 ) worlds, the least S 1 worlds will be ranked lower than any world in which S 1 isn't true. The second part expresses another fundamental property of the approach, that after revising by a set S, for S 2 ⊂ S 1 ⊂ S, the minimum (S \ S 1 ) worlds are ranked below the minimum (S \ S 2 ) worlds. Both parts refer to the faithful ranking corresponding to K ⊗ S. Together they can be thought of as expressing a relation among conditional (or counterfactual) beliefs; that is, after revising by S, the faithful ranking given by K ⊗ S reflects the counterfactual assertion that if some members of S were determined to be false, the remaining elements of S would still be believed to be true. Hence if a revision by S were in fact followed by a revision wherein some members of S were asserted to be false, the remaining elements of S would be believed to be true. We obtain the representation result:
Theorem 2 Let ⊗ be a revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8).
1. ⊗ satisfies (P ⊗ ) iff it revises faithful rankings according to (P ⊗ R).
⊗ satisfies (S ⊗ ) iff it revises faithful rankings according to (S ⊗ R).
An AGM revision operator that satisfies postulates (P ⊗ ) and (S ⊗ ) will be referred to as a (basic) parallel revision operator.
We have shown that in revising by a set of formulas S, and then revising by the negations of some subset S of S, that the remaining members of S will continue to be believed. The next result shows that if we revise by a set of formulas S, and then revise where some formulas of a subset S of S are false (but it is not necessarily known which), then the other formulas in S will continue to be believed. This result is more or less a corollary to the factoring result in AGM revision in the context of parallel revision.
Proposition 4 Let ⊗ be a basic parallel revision operator and let S 1 ⊂ S.
Then
Thus, if all we know is that some members of S \ S 1 are false, then S 1 will still be believed after revising by S followed by ∨(S \ S 1 ). Some examples will make the properties and ramifications of the approach clear. Throughout the following examples, K will be some belief state and S will be a set of formulas. α, β, γ will be logically independent formulas, that is, for φ 1 , φ 2 ∈ {α, β, γ} if φ 1 φ 2 then φ 1 = φ 2 .
The first example considers the situation where the elements of the set for revision are independent.
Example 4 Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α, β, γ}.
We get that in a faithful ranking resulting from the revision K⊗S , the least {α, β, γ} worlds are strictly less than the least {α, β, ¬γ} worlds, which in turn are strictly less than the least {α, ¬β, ¬γ} worlds.
Consequently we obtain:
The first two parts illustrate the basic property of the approach in the case of logically independent formulas: that revising by a set of formulas, then by the negation of some members of the set leaves the remaining elements still in the agent's belief set. The last part illustrates the result given in Proposition 4. In the next example, the elements of the set for revision are not independent.
Example 5 Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α, α ∧ β, γ}. We obtain:
On the other hand, there are resulting faithful rankings in which
In the first case, since β is believed to be false, then α ∧ β must certainly also be false. On the other hand, the other elements of the set, α and γ continue to be believed after revision by ¬β. Similarly in the second part, if α is false, then γ can continue to be believed. The following two examples illustrate a very interesting phenomenon, that the approach can be used to express a preference over which formulas are accepted.
Example 6 Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α, α ∧ β}.
With respect to the agent's contingent beliefs, revision by {α, α ∧ β} is of course the same as revision by {α ∧ β}.
However, we also obtain:
That is, in revising by {α, α ∧ β}, we effectively encode the preference that if one of α or β are to be subsequently given up, then β will be given up and α retained. In terms of faithful rankings, we have the following. After revising K by S = {α, α ∧ β}, at the minimum worlds in the resulting ranking, {α, α ∧ β} will be true. For subsets S 1 of S, we must have that S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) is consistent. This will be the case for S 1 = {α} and (PP ⊗ R) stipulates that the minimum ¬α ∨ ¬β worlds in the ranking associated with K ⊗ S is the same as the minimum {α} ∪ {(α ∧ β)} = {α ∧ ¬β} worlds associated with K. Hence in revising by S and then {¬α ∨ ¬β}, we get that {α ∧ ¬β} is true in the resulting belief set.
Example 7 Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α, α ∨ β}.
Clearly, for atoms α, β, we don't generally obtain that β ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α, α ∨ β}), since the logical content of {α, α ∨ β} is equivalent to that of {α}.
However, we do obtain:
Thus, after revising by {α, α∨β} we don't necessarily believe that β is true; however we do believe that β is true on subsequently revising by {¬α}. This result, on reflection, is to be expected: In revising by a set, if one of the elements of the set is found later to be false then, where consistently possible, the remaining elements of the set would still be believed. Thus in revising by {α, α ∨ β}, if α were subsequently determined to be false then the remaining element, viz. α ∨ β would remain true. But since α is now believed false, this requires that β is now believed to be true. Thus in this case in revising by {α, α ∨ β}, a preference is established between α and β, to the effect of "accept α, but if it is subsequently found to be false, accept β."
The next two examples deal with revising by a set of formulas where the set is inconsistent. In the first case, individual elements of the set are consistent; in the second, some member of the set is inconsistent. In both cases, we obtain desirable results in subsequent revisions. This illustrates that, even though revision by an inconsistent set is defined to yield an inconsistent belief set, the underlying faithful ranking nonetheless retains nontrivial information about the agent's belief state.
Example 8 Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α, ¬α, β, γ}.
Obviously Bel(K ⊗ {α, ¬α, β, γ}) is inconsistent. However we obtain the following:
Analogous results obtain when an element of the set for revision is inconsistent.
Example 9 Consider K ⊗ S where S = {⊥, α, β}. We obtain:
Parallel Revision and Iterated Revision
The basic approach only deals with limited situations where we first revise by a set of formulas then by the negations of some of these formulas. In this section, we extend the basic approach to deal with more general cases. We first show that the straightforward generalization of the wellknown iterated revision postulates are problematic and insufficient. Then, we present a postulate of evidence retainment, which offers an alternative that avoids these difficulties.
We start with the following generalization of the DP postulates to sets of formulas, as suggested by [ Zhang, 2004 ] .
We remark that, while (C1 ⊗ ), (C3 ⊗ ) and (C4 ⊗ ) still seem as reasonable as their counterparts, (C2 ⊗ ) is not desirable. First, previous criticisms of (C2) apply equally well to (C2 ⊗ ). Second, (C2 ⊗ ) is clearly inconsistent with (P ⊗ ) in the presence of the (adapted to sets) AGM postulates. As a specific example, let α and β be logically independent formulas, and assume that ¬α ∈ Bel(K) and β ∈ Bel(K).
On the other hand, (P ⊗ ) requires that {α} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ {α, β} ⊗ {¬β}). Hence, we do not consider (C2 ⊗ ) further as a general postulate for parallel revision.
For reference, the semantical conditions for the DP postulates can be generalised as follows.
To show (C2 ⊗ ) is undesirable from another perspective, one may argue that (C2 ⊗ R) is overly strong: in the case where w 2 satisfies more sentences of S than w 1 , it is perfectly reasonable that we might have w 2 ≺ K⊗S w 1 even if w 1 K w 2 .
Similarly, we can also generalise the postulate of independence and its corresponding semantical condition:
Note that, among the above-mentioned postulates, (C2 ⊗ ) is the only one which deals with the case where S 1 and S 2 are jointly inconsistent. This suggests that we need some new postulates in order to address this situation. As already argued, it is too radical to give up all formulas of S 1 (as imposed by (C ⊗ 2)) just because S 1 ∪ S 2 is inconsistent. The question is, in revising by S 1 and then S 2 when S 1 ∪ S 2 is inconsistent, what formulas in S 1 should be retained? Intuitively, a formula α ∈ S 1 should be kept if there is no evidence (in S 1 and S 2 ) against α after learning S 2 . To formalise this idea, we need the following definition:
Definition 2 Let S 1 , S 2 be two sets of sentences. We denote by S 1 ||S 2 the set of all subsets of S 1 that are consistent with S 2 . That is S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 iff:
Formally, the fact that there exists evidence in S 1 against α after learning S 2 (given the original belief state K) can be expressed as: ∃S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 such that ¬α ∈ Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )).
Based on these considerations, we obtain the so-called postulate of evidence retainment:
This postulate is inspired by the postulate of core retainment [ Hansson, 1999 ] , which says a formula α is removed from a belief set K by a contraction with β only if there is some evidence in K that shows that α contributes to the implication of β. Formally, core retainment is expressed as follows:
The postulate of evidence retainment can be equivalently rephrased as follows:
(Ret ⊗ ) If α ∈ S 1 , and for every S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 where
Recall Example 1 with S 1 = {a, m} and S 2 = {¬a}. Since S 1 ||S 2 = {{m}}, Postulate (Ret ⊗ ) implies that (K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 m, which gives us the desired result. Note that, in case a and m make up a single piece of information (i.e. S 1 = {a ∧ m}), Postulate (Ret ⊗ ) does not apply. To give a formal justification for (Ret ⊗ ), we will show a representation theorem.
Definition 3 Let S be a set of sentences and w a possible world. Then S|w denotes the set of elements of S which are true in w, i.e., S|w = {α ∈ S | w |= α}.
The following theorem gives a necessary and sufficient semantical condition for (Ret ⊗ ):
Theorem 3 Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8). Then ⊗ satisfies (Ret ⊗ ) iff it revises faithful rankings in the following manner:
Arguably, (Ret ⊗ R) is very natural and intuitive. It essentially says: if w 1 confirms more new information (in S) than w 2 , and w 1 is at least as plausible as w 2 , then w 1 becomes more plausible than w 2 after revising by S. It is not difficult to see that (Ret ⊗ ) implies (Ind ⊗ ).
Proposition 5 Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (
For the effect of (Ret ⊗ ), consider the following example.
Example 10 Let ⊗ be a revision operator satisfying Postulates (
, and (Ret ⊗ ). Let α, β, and γ be logically independent formulas. We obtain:
On the other hand, there is a revision operator ⊗ satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8), (K ⊗ P ), and (K ⊗ S), but not (Ret ⊗ ), such that ¬α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {¬β, γ}) and α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α, β} ⊗ {¬β, γ}).
The examples of the previous section are of the form K ⊗ S ⊗ T where members of T were denials of elements of S. In the basic approach to parallel revision, it is possible to have α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α, β} ⊗ {¬β, γ}) because, after the revision K ⊗ {α, β}, the minimal ¬β worlds will also have α be true, as expected. However, the minimal ¬β worlds may also happen to have ¬γ also be true; the basic approach places no constraints on the minimal ¬β ∧ γ worlds, and at these worlds it is quite possible that α not be true. On the other hand, (Ret ⊗ ) guarantees that α is believed following the revisions by {α, β} and {¬β, γ}, provided ¬α is not believed in a revision by {¬β, γ}. Informally, in revising by {α, β}, we have that α will be believed, and in the subsequent revision {¬β, γ} if there is no reason to disbelieve α.
Based on similar considerations, we present two additional postulates which also seem quite intuitive, and which naturally extend (C3 ⊗ ) and (C4 ⊗ ).
Essentially, (PC3 ⊗ ) says if all evidence in S 1 supports α after learning S 2 , then α must be believed; (PC4 ⊗ ) says if no evidence in S 1 is against α, then there is no reason to believe ¬α. We present a representation theorem for (PC3 ⊗ ) and (PC4 ⊗ ) as the formal justification.
Theorem 4 Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8). Then ⊗ satisfies (PC3 ⊗ ) and (PC4 ⊗ ) iff it revises faithful rankings in the following manner:
It can be observed that (PC3 ⊗ R) and (PC4 ⊗ R) extend (C3 ⊗ R) and (C4 ⊗ R), respectively.
Proposition 6 Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8).
Then ⊗ satisfies (PC3 ⊗ ) only if it satisfies (C3 ⊗ ); and ⊗ satisfies (PC4 ⊗ ) only if it satisfies (C4 ⊗ ).
Moreover, the semantical conditions of (PC3 ⊗ R) and (PC4 ⊗ R) require that the relative ordering of two possible worlds remain unchanged, provided they satisfy the same subset of the new information.
Proposition 7 (PC3
⊗ R) and (PC3 ⊗ R) imply the following semantical condition:
It is not difficult to see that (PC3 ⊗ ) and (PC4 ⊗ ) together imply (C1 ⊗ ) and (K ⊗ S).
Proposition 8 Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8). If ⊗ satisfies (PC3 ⊗ ) and (PC4 ⊗ ) then it also satisfies (C1 ⊗ ) and (K ⊗ S).
As well, (P ⊗ ) does not follow from (Ret ⊗ ), (PC3 ⊗ ), and (PC4 ⊗ ); we give an example in terms of the corresponding semantical conditions. 9 Consider the language over propositional atoms a and b, and the faithful ranking K given by:
Assume that after revising by S = {a, b} the faithful ranking K⊗S is given by:
It can be verified that K⊗S satisfies (Ret ⊗ R), (PC3 ⊗ R), and (PC4 ⊗ R), but not (P ⊗ R). We conclude with a result that further illustrates the relation between the basic parallel revision postulates and those for iterated revision. It has already been noted that (P ⊗ ), and so (PP ⊗ ), does not follow from (Ret ⊗ ). However, we can show that a weakened version of (PP ⊗ ) does follow from (Ret ⊗ ). Consider the following weaker versions of (PP ⊗ ) and (PP ⊗ R):
It is not difficult to see that (Ret ⊗ ), (PC3 ⊗ ) and (PC4 ⊗ ) together imply (PP ⊗ ).
Proposition 9 Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (
Based on the above development, we suggest a general parallel revision operator should satisfy the AGM postulates (extended to sets), (P ⊗ ), (Ret ⊗ ), (PC3 ⊗ ), and (PC4 ⊗ ).
OCF-Based Parallel Revision
Up to this point, we have considered those properties that parallel revision, regarded a mathematical function, should satisfy. We now present a concrete parallel revision operator which satisfies all the proposed postulates. The operator is based on Spohn's proposal of ordinal conditional functions [ Spohn, 1988 ] . Originally, an ordinal conditional function (OCF) was defined as a mapping κ from the set of possible worlds Θ P to the class of ordinals such that some world was assigned the value 0. An OCF provides one concrete form of a belief state. As in [ Spohn, 1991 ] , for the sake of simplicity, we take the signature of an OCF κ as Θ P → N, where κ(w) is called the rank of w. Intuitively, the rank of a world represents its degree of plausibility. The lower a world's rank, the more plausible that world is. A formula α is in the belief set Bel (κ) just if every world of rank 0 is a model of α; that is:
The corresponding faithful ranking can be defined as follows:
Given an OCF κ, we extend this function to a ranking on sentences (or sets of sentences) as follows:
Put in words, the rank of a sentence is the lowest rank of a world in which the sentence holds.
In what follows we give a concrete parallel revision function in terms of an OCF. That is, for a given OCF κ and finite set of formulas S, we define a revised OCF κ ⊗ S; the corresponding faithful ranking can then be obtained via (3).
Consider for reference the semantic conditions for parallel revision:
We will use the following notation: Let S be a finite set of formulas, and let S 1 ⊆ S.
C s (S 1 ) = S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) min(µ, κ) = {w | w |= µ, and for every w where κ(w ) < κ(w), w |= µ} Mnemonically, C s (S 1 ) is the "completion" of S 1 with respect to S: If α ∈ S\S 1 then ¬α ∈ C s (S 1 ). min(µ, κ) is the set of least µ worlds with respect to κ. We also use min(S, κ) for a set of formulas S to denote the κ-least set of S-worlds.
The construction of κ⊗S is given in terms of a recurrence relation. The definition is admittedly somewhat complicated, although each part of the definition reflects a basic intuition concerning postulates of parallel OCF revision. Consequently, after presenting the definition, we discuss intuitions underlying the parts of the definition, and then provide a formal statement that shows that the definition indeed specifies a general parallel revision operator.
Definition 4 Let κ be an ordinal conditional function over Θ P and let S be a finite satisfiable set of sentences. Define the parallel OCF revision of κ by S, κ ⊗ S, by 1. If w ∈ min(S, κ) then (κ ⊗ S)(w) = 0.
2. Assume that (κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) has been assigned for every w 1 ∈ Θ P where w 1 ∈ min(C s (S 1 ), κ) , and where S 1 ⊆ S and |S| − |S 1 | < i for i > 0.
Let w 2 ∈ min(C s (S 2 ), κ) where S 2 ⊂ S and |S| − |S 2 | = i. Then
Each part of the definition applies to a particular set of worlds with respect to κ. The first condition in the definition applies to minimum S worlds in κ, and ensures that these worlds are given rank 0 in κ ⊗ S; the remaining conditions implicitly assign a rank greater than 0 to all other worlds. The second part of the definition assigns ranks in κ ⊗ S to minimum (in κ) C s (S 1 ) worlds for every S 1 ⊂ S. This part is phrased iteratively, working from larger subsets of S to smaller. The third part of the definition assigns ranks in κ ⊗ S to all remaining worlds.
Intuitively the various postulates are obtained as follows. Since the set of 0-ranked worlds in κ ⊗ S is the same as the minimum S worlds in κ, and since every world is assigned a rank in κ ⊗ S, it follows that κ ⊗ S defines a faithful ranking. Thus, via [ Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991 ] we have an AGM revision operator. (P ⊗ R) is obtained by requiring, for S 2 ⊂ S 1 ⊆ S where
That is, in κ ⊗ S the rank of the least C s (S 2 ) worlds is greater than the rank of the the least C s (S 1 ) worlds. This is taken care of by (4) in the definition. The general case, where |S 2 | + i = |S 1 | for i > 0 follows trivially by transitivity of ≥. (PC3 ⊗ R) and (PC4 ⊗ R) are obtained by a condition similar to that in [ Darwiche and Pearl, 1997 ] , adjusted for subsets of a set of formulas for revision: For worlds w 1 and w 2 where we have S 1 |w 1 = S 1 |w 2 for S 1 ⊆ S, we require that the difference in rankings between w 1 and w 2 will be the same in κ⊗S as in κ. Condition 3 of the definition ensures that this is the case. (Ret ⊗ R) is trickier; refer to Figure 1 , where we have that κ(w 1 ) = κ(w 2 ), and assume that w 1 ∈ Mod (C s (S 1 )) and w 2 ∈ Mod (C s (S 2 )). The minimum C s (S 1 ) and C s (S 2 ) worlds are indicated by arrows on the κ ranking. A potential problem arises, in that to this point there is nothing to prevent
Our constraints for (PC3 ⊗ R) and (PC4 ⊗ R) require that the respective distances d 1 and d 2 be the same in κ and κ ⊗ S, and this would yield that (5) in the definition ensures that this doesn't occur, and so that (Ret ⊗ R) is satisfied. To establish formally that the definition indeed stipulates a parallel OCF revision function, we first state several small results that identify pertinent facts concerning the definition.
First, the definition yields an AGM revision function.
Lemma 1 Let κ be an OCF and let κ ⊗ S be given by Definition 4. Then κ ⊗ S defines a faithful ranking.
The next lemma shows that the definition satisfies the basic parallel revision postulate.
Lemma 2 Let κ be an OCF, let κ ⊗ S be given by Definition 4, and let
As well, worlds that satisfy exactly the same elements of a set S retain their relative ranking before and after revision.
Lemma 3 Let κ be an OCF, let κ ⊗ S be given by Definition 4, and let
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 5 Parallel OCF revision satisfies the extended AGM postulates, (P ⊗ ), (Ret ⊗ ), (PC3 ⊗ ), and (PC4 ⊗ ).
Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an account of parallel belief revision, in which the second argument to a revision function is a finite set of formulas. Each formula of the set represents an individual item of information. Thus K * {α, β} specifies a revision of K by two formulas, while K * {α ∧ β} specifies a revision of K by a single formula that happens to be expressed as a conjunction. The intention is that, following revision by a set of formulas, if a subsequent revision is in conflict with some members of the original set, then belief in the other elements of that set is retained. Thus, in revising by {α, β} and then by {¬β}, then, if α and β are independent, α continues to be believed in the resulting belief state. This is not necessarily the case in revising by {α ∧ β} and then by {¬β}. Informally, a revision K * {α, β} can be seen as yielding not just the (contingent) incorporation of α and β among the beliefs of K, but also incorporating a counterfactual assumption that if one of α or β were subsequently believed to be false, then the agent would still believe the other formula to be true (provided there is no positive logical dependence between α and β).
We presented two accounts of parallel belief revision. First, we consider a basic approach, in which minimal conditions for revising by a set of formulas are developed. Two postulates are proposed, along with corresponding semantic conditions, and a representation result is given. Semantically we require that in a revision by a set of formulas S, in the associated faithful ordering on worlds, for S 1 ⊂ S, at the least S \ S 1 worlds we also have that S 1 is true. As a consequence, problems associated with the DP postulate (C2) are sidestepped. Second, we develop a "preferred" account of iterated parallel revision, consisting of an additional three new postulates. This is carried out by extending the approach of Jin and Thielscher [ 2007 ] for iterated revision to deal with sets of formulas. Again, corresponding semantic conditions are given and a representation result derived. Last, Section 5 provides a concrete construction of a parallel revision operator.
Our account of parallel revision is intended as an extension of the AGM approach. In particular, revising by an inconsistent set of formulas yields an inconsistent belief set. For future work, an obvious and interesting extension is to examine revision in the case of an inconsistent set of formulas. As the examples at the end of Section 3 indicate, there is information that may be gleaned in revising by an inconsistent set of formulas, provided some of the elements of the set are consistent. Thus, given some "reasonable" means of extracting consistent information from a set S, say ∆(S), one could express revision as follows:
Hence in this case, if β were consistent, one would expect that Bel(K ⊗ {α, ¬α, β}) would also be consistent and entail β, while Bel(K ⊗ {α ∧ ¬α ∧ β}) would of course be inconsistent. In this way, one might obtain consistent revisions in some cases where the input is inconsistent.
Last, as indicated in the examples in the basic approach, parallel revision may be used to encode preferences over formulas with respect to revision. A second, intriguing direction for future research is to further explore this phenomenon, to determine to what extent the present approach may be used to express a general notion of preference over formulas in revision.
For W ⊆ Θ P , f orm(W) is a formula such that W = Mod (f orm(W)). Since we assume a finite underlying language, such a formula is guaranteed to exist. Most often we will have |W| = 2, and to avoid an overabundance of brackets we will abuse notation and write e.g. K ⊗ {f orm({w 1 , w 2 })} as K ⊗ f orm(w 1 , w 2 ).
In analogy to Bel(K) standing for the set of sentences comprising the belief set of K (and to simplify notation), Mod (K) will be the set of models of the belief set of K. I.e. Mod (K) is defined as Mod (Bel(K)).
Proof of Proposition 1: Assume that S 1 ⊂ S and that S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) is consistent.
(a) (PP
From the success postulate we have that
, from which we obtain (PP ⊗ ).
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. Assume that S 1 ⊂ S and that S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) is consistent.
(a) (PP
We have that min(Mod (
2. (P ⊗ R) and (S ⊗ R) imply (PP ⊗ R):
, from which we obtain (PP ⊗ R).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Let K be a belief state and let K be the faithful ranking induced by the faithful assignment induced by K. Let K⊗S satisfy (P ⊗ R) and (S ⊗ R). Then K⊗S satisfies (PP ⊗ R) by the preceding result.
Let w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ). By (PP ⊗ R), w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K ), whence w ∈ Mod (S 1 ), and so w |= S 1 .
Since w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ) and w |= S 1 , and since K⊗S is a faithful ranking, it follows that w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ).
Conversely, assume w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ). If w |= S \ S 1 or w |= S 1 , then trivially w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ). So assume that w |= S \ S 1 and w |= S 1 .
Towards a contradiction assume that w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ). Then since w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ), for any w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ) we have w ≺ K⊗S w.
However, (PP ⊗ R) implies that w |= S 1 , and this together with w ≺ K⊗S w contradicts w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ).
Hence w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ), which was to be shown.
2. Assume S 2 ⊂ S 1 ⊂ S and S 2 S 1 .
Let w 1 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ) and w 2 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 2 ), K⊗S )
Since S 2 ⊂ S 1 we have that (S \ S 1 ) ⊂ (S \ S 2 ), and so (S \ S 1 ) ⊂ (S \ S 2 ). From this together with (1) , and since K⊗S is a faithful ranking, it follows that w 1 K⊗S w 2 .
Since w 1 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ), we obtain via (PP ⊗ R) that
, and so w 1 |= S 1 .
By the same argument with respect to w 2 and S 2 we get that w 2 |= S 2 .
Consider φ ∈ (S 1 \ S 2 ). We have that w 2 |= ¬φ since w 2 |= S \ S 2 and φ ∈ S \ S 2 .
As well, φ ∈ S 1 .
From Part 1 of the proposition, we showed that
Thus, since w 2 |= ¬φ and φ ∈ S 1 , so w 2 ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ), and so w 2 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ).
We have already shown that w 1 K⊗S w 2 . However, since w 1 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ), w 2 |= S \ S 1 , and w 2 ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ), it follows that w 1 ≺ K⊗S w 2 .
Proof of Theorem 2.
It is more compact to show each direction for the two conditions, rather than showing both directions for each postulate.
Construction to Postulates: Let be a faithful ranking induced by an underlying epistemic state, and define ⊗ according to (2) , i.e.
Katsuno and Mendelzon [ 1991 ] show that ⊗ satisfies (K ⊗ 1)-(K ⊗ 8).
1. Let satisfy (P ⊗ R). To show that ⊗ satisfies P ⊗ , let S 1 ⊂ S where (2), which was to be shown.
Let satisfy (S
Thus in the associated faithful ranking we have w ∈ min(Mod (
But then in terms of our defined revision operator this means that w ∈ Mod (K ⊗ S ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))).
Consequently, we have that
Mod (K ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))) ⊆ Mod (K ⊗ S ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))). The reverse containment follows by noting that each step above is in fact an if-andonly-if. We obtain that Mod (K ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))) = Mod (K ⊗ S ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))), whence Bel(K ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))) = Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))).
Postulates to Construction:
Define, for every w 1 , w 2 ∈ Θ P , w 1 K w 2 iff w 1 ∈ Mod (K ⊗ f orm(w 1 , w 2 )). We have from [ Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991 ] that K (and so of course K⊗S ) is a total preorder that captures one-shot AGM revision.
1. We need to show that, given this definition and Postulate (P ⊗ ) that condition (P ⊗ R) holds. Let S 1 ⊂ S where S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) ⊥. Let w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ). Since K⊗S is a faithful ranking, this means that w ∈ Mod (K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S 1 )). By (P ⊗ ) we obtain that w |= S 1 , from which it follows that min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ) ⊆ Mod (S 1 ).
2. We need to show that, given the initial definition and Postulate (S ⊗ ) that condition (S ⊗ R) holds.
Let S 1 ⊂ S. If S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) ⊥, then (S ⊗ R) holds trivially.
So assume that S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ) ⊥, and let w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K ). Thus w ∈ Mod (K ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))). Therefore by (S ⊗ ) we obtain that w ∈ Mod (K ⊗ S ⊗ (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 ))).
Consequently w ∈ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ). This shows that min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K ) ⊆ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ). The reverse containment, viz. min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K⊗S ) ⊆ min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K ) follows by observing that each step above is in fact an if-and-only-if.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof is by induction on |S \ S 1 |. If |S \ S 1 | = 1 then for S \ S 1 = {φ} we are to show that S 1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}). But this is just an instance of (P ⊗ ). If |S \ S 1 | = 2 then the result follows from the factoring result in AGM revision. That is, let S \ S 1 = {φ, ψ}. Then the AGM factoring result yields
or Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}) ∩ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}).
We have already noted that S \ {φ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}), from which it trivially follows that S \ {φ, ψ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}), and analogously S \ {φ, ψ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}). It follows also that S \ {φ, ψ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}) ∩ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}), from which our result follows using the factoring result.
The general case with |S \ S 1 | > 2 follows by a straightforward induction, again using the AGM factoring result. We omit the details.
Lemma 4 Let S, S be two sets of sentences and w 1 , w 2 two possible worlds, such that Mod (S ) = {w 1 , w 2 } and S|w 2 ⊆ S|w 1 . Then for all A ⊆ S such that A ∪ S is consistent, we have w 1 |= A.
Proof: Suppose there exists A ⊆ S such that, A ∪ S is consistent and w 1 |= A. Since Mod (S ) = {w 1 , w 2 }, it follows that w 2 |= A. From S|w 2 ⊆ S|w 1 , we have A ⊇ S|w 1 . This contradicts w 1 |= A.
Proof of Theorem 3:
(⇒) Assume S|w 2 ⊂ S|w 1 , w 1 K w 2 and w 2 K⊗S w 1 . Let S be a set of sentences such that, Mod (S ) = {w 1 , w 2 }. Let α ∈ S be a sentence such that, w 1 |= α and w 2 |= α. From Lemma 4, it follows that ∀S c ∈ S||S that w 1 |= S c . Thus w 1 |= S c ∪ S . From w 1 K w 2 , it follows that w 1 |= Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S )). Therefore, Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S )) ¬α. Then (Ret ⊗ ) implies that Bel ((K ⊗ S) ⊗ S ) α, which contradicts w 2 K⊗S w 1 .
(⇐) Assume α ∈ S 1 , ∀S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 that we have Bel (K⊗(S c ∪S 2 )) ¬α and Bel ((K⊗S 1 )⊗S 2 ) α. Let w 2 be a possible world such that w 2 |= Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ) and w 2 |= α. Let S c = S 1 |w 2 . Obviously, S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 . Thus Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) ¬α. Let w 1 be a possible world such that w 1 |= Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) and w 1 |= α. It follows immediately that w 1 K w 2 . Since w 1 |= S c , w 1 |= α and w 2 |= α, we have S 1 |w 2 ⊂ S 1 |w 1 . Thus (Ret ⊗ R) implies w 1 ≺ K⊗S 1 w 2 . This contradicts w 2 |= Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ).
Proof of Proposition 5:
It suffices to show that (Ret ⊗ R) implies (Ind ⊗ R). Assume w 1 = S, w 2 |= S and w 1 K w 2 . Obviously, S|w 2 ⊂ S|w 1 . From (Ret ⊗ R), it follows that w 1 ≺ K⊗S w 2 .
Proof of Theorem 4:
1. (⇒) Assume S|w 2 ⊆ S|w 1 , w 1 ≺ K w 2 and w 2 K⊗S w 1 . Let S be a set of sentences such that Mod (S ) = {w 1 , w 2 }. From Lemma 4, it follows that ∀S c ∈ S||S we have w 1 |= S c . Thus Mod (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S )) = {w 1 }, since w 1 ≺ K w 2 . Let α be a sentence such that w 1 |= α and w 2 |= α. It follows that ∀S c ∈ S||S we have Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S )) α. Then (PC3 ⊗ ) implies that Bel ((K ⊗ S) ⊗ S ) α. This contradicts w 2 K⊗S w 1 and w 2 |= α. (⇐) Assume ∀S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 we have Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) α, and Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ) α.
Let w 2 be a possible world such that w 2 |= Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ) and w 2 |= α. Let S c = S 1 |w 2 . Obviously, S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 . Thus Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) α. Let w 1 be a possible world such that w 1 |= Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )). It is easy to see that w 1 ≺ K w 2 and S c |w 2 ⊆ S c |w 1 . Then (PC3 ⊗ R) implies w 1 ≺ K⊗S 1 w 2 . This contradicts w 2 |= Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ).
(⇒)
Assume S|w 2 ⊆ S|w 1 , w 1 K w 2 and w 2 ≺ K⊗S w 1 . Let S be a set of sentences such that Mod (S ) = {w 1 , w 2 }. From Lemma 4, it follows that ∀S c ∈ S||S we have that w 1 |= S c . Thus w 1 |= Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S )), since w 1 K w 2 . Let α be a sentence such that w 1 |= α and w 2 |= α. It follows that Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S )) ¬α. Then (PC4 ⊗ ) implies that Bel ((K ⊗ S) ⊗ S ) ¬α. This contradicts w 2 ≺ K⊗S w 1 and w 2 |= α. (⇐) Assume ∀S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 we have that Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) ¬α, and Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ) ¬α. Let w 2 be a possible world such that w 2 |= Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ). Let S c = S 1 |w 2 . Obviously, S c ∈ S 1 ||S 2 . Thus Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) ¬α. Let w 1 be a possible world such that w 1 |= Bel (K ⊗ (S c ∪ S 2 )) and w 1 |= α. It is easy to see that w 1 K w 2 and S 1 |w 2 ⊆ S 1 |w 1 . Then (PC4 ⊗ R) implies that w 1 K⊗S 1 w 2 . Thus w 1 |= Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ), which contradicts Bel ((K ⊗ S 1 ) ⊗ S 2 ) ¬α.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Assume S|w 2 = S|w 1 . Suppose w 1 K w 2 . Then (PC4 ⊗ R) implies w 1 K⊗S w 2 . Suppose w 1 K⊗S w 2 . It follows from (PC3 ⊗ R) that w 2 ≺ K w 1 . Thus w 1 K w 2 , since K is total.
Proof of Proposition 9:
It suffices to show that (Ret ⊗ R), (PC3 ⊗ R) and (PC4 ⊗ R) imply (PP ⊗ R ). Let S 1 ⊂ S where S 1 is consistent with Bel(K⊗(S \ S 1 )). Thus there is a possible world w such that w ∈ min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K ) and w |= S 1 . We need to show that min(Mod (S 1 ∪ (S \ S 1 )), K ) = min(Mod (S \ S 1 ), K⊗S ).
Rearranging terms yields:
(κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) − κ(w 1 ) = (κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) − κ(w 1 ) (9) (κ ⊗ S)(w 2 ) − κ(w 2 ) = (κ ⊗ S)(w 2 ) − κ(w 2 )
From the first case, above, we have:
(κ ⊗ S)(w 2 ) − (κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) > κ(w 2 ) − κ(w 1 ), or (κ ⊗ S)(w 2 ) − κ(w 2 ) > (κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) − κ(w 1 )
Substituting (9) and (10) into the above gives (κ ⊗ S)(w 2 ) − κ(w 2 ) > (κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) − κ(w 1 ) and rearranging terms gives (κ ⊗ S)(w 2 ) − (κ ⊗ S)(w 1 ) > κ(w 2 ) − κ(w 1 ), which establishes the result.
